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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYAL NORDELL ALLRED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK E. COOK, BRYANT MADSEN, 
KENNETH R. STRATE and TOM 
MOWER, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for slander. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
CASE NO. 15688 
Each of the defendants made motions to dismiss plaintifrs 
Complaint which the court granted by written order on the 24th 
day of February, 1978. Arguments of all parties were submitted 
in writing. The court concluded that the statements alleged to 
have been made by defendants did not amount to actionable libel 
or slander and that defendants were immune because of their ca-
pacity as school board members. There was neither testimony, 
other evidence or oral argument submitted to the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the 
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district court and remand to the district court for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are contained in plaintiff's Complaint. For the 
purpose of considering whether plaintiff's Complaint should have 
been dismissed, the allegations of the Complaint must be taken 
as true. As part of his statement of facts, plaintiff herewith 
incorporates said Complaint (R 1-5) as though set forth herein 
in full. Briefly summarized the facts are as follows. 
Prior to the incidents in question, plaintiff enjoyed an 
outstanding reputation in his profession (Educator) and in his 
community (Mt. Pleasant City and Sanpete County, Utah), and be-
yond. The defendants Cook, Madsen and Strate were members of the 
North Sanpete Board of Education. On or about May 23, 1977, they 
asked plaintiff to join them in their auto in a parking lot. When 
he did, they told him: 
"You have interfered with us for the last time, 
we want your resignation". 
The defendant Madsen added: 
"And we want it within twenty-four (24) hours". 
When plaintiff asked the reason, the defendant Cook said: 
"We have twenty-seven (27) charges against you 
and if you do not resign, we will bring those 
charges out in public at the next Board meet-
ing". 
(The next Board meeting would occur on May 26, 1977, three days 
later.) 
-2-
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The defendant Strate said: 
"I feel I have to go along with these men in this 
problem". 
Thereafter, the defendants and each of them, told many persons of 
their claim that they had twenty-seven (27) charges against plain-
tiff that would be brought out publicly in the next public meet-
ing of the Board, which resulted in a public outcry. The defen-
dant Strate in a Spring City town meeting, called by interested 
citizens, told the meeting which consisted of forty (40) to sixty 
(60) people, that: 
"That they (defendants) had twenty-seven (27) charges 
against the Superintendant (plaintiff)", and further 
invited the people to: 
"Come to the Board meeting and see what they are". 
(Referring to the Board meeting of May 26, 1977). 
Thereafter said defendants publicly denied they had said charges 
but privately started, fed and encouraged rumors that they had such 
charges but could not bring them out because of possible legal con-
sequences. 
Plaintiff's Complaint further alleged that said statements were 
made intentionally, deliberately, maliciously and recklessly to injure 
plaintiff and his reputation as an educator and in the community. 
Plaintiff's Complaint alleged there was a large public outcry 
and he was in fact damaged in his reputation by persons who believed 
the statements in question directly, and by persons who did not believe, 
because to them he was rendered "controversial". 
-3-
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While plaintiff contends the following facts relate to 
matters of privilege and/or immunity which are matters of de-
fense, they are herewith offered for clarification. Plaintiff does 
not herewith undertake any factual burdens which are not his by 
law or the rules of court. 
At the time of the utterances complained of, plaintiff's 
c~ntract had less than sixty (60) days to run. (The utterances 
were on May 23, 1977 and later, and plaintiff's contract expired 
at the end of June, 1977.) The school board had been sharply di-
vided on many issues -- the three defendant members opposed to the 
remaining two members. One of the matters about which they were 
divided was their respective support and non-support for the 
plaintiff Superintendant. Accordingly, the three defendant members 
could not remove plaintiff for cause because they require a two-
thirds (2/3) vote, wt-.ich :hev did not have (UCA 53-6-7). They were 
too late to fail to renew his contract because the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act UCA 53-51-5-(2) and (5) required 
both a notice of intent not to renew sixty (60) days prior to the 
expiration of the contract and another notice thirty (30) days 
prior to that. 
It follows that at the time of the utterances complained of 
the defendant school board members were attempting to accomplish 
by malicious coercion and slander what they could not accomplish 
by motion and vote in their role as school board members. 
Said matters were pointed out to the court by defendants and ~·· 
plaintiff (R 59). They were ·well known in the community and may con-
stitute part of the context in which the court considered this matte 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum an  Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS CONSTITUTE ACTIONABLE SLANDER PER SE. 
Defendants claim that they published no slander because they 
did not communicate any specific wrongdoing on the part of the 
plaintiff. But where the words complained of convey a defamatory 
inference, they are actionable although there is no specific alle-
gation. 
"For to render a defamatory statement actionable, 
it is not necessary that the charge be made in a 
direct,positive, and open manner. If the words 
used, when taken in their ordinary acceptation con-
vey a defamatory imputation, no matter how indirect-
ly, they are actionable, and it matters not how art-
fully their meaning is concealed or disguised. A 
mere inference, implication, or insinuation is as 
actionable as a positive assertion if the meaning 
is plain. The test is whether the words, taken in 
the sense in which they are reasonably understood 
under the circumstances by persons familiar with 
the language used, are capable of a defamatory con-
struction." 
50 Am.Jur.2d§l3p528-9 
When the defendant school board members told the plaintiff: 
"You have interfered with us for the last time", and then stated, 
"We have twenty-seven charges against you and if you do not resign, 
we will bring those charges out in public at the next Board meet-
ing", the thrust of their threat was that the plaintiff would be 
forced to resign if he did not do so immediately. Either the 
charges would reveal acts or an act sufficient to allow them to 
remove him from his position as Superintendant for cause, or 
-5-
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the revelation of the charges would induce him to resign because 
of his public shame. The defendants' characterization of their 
actions in their Memoranda in lower court makes it clear that this 
is the interpretation they intended. Defendant Madsen reports the 
allegations as being that "[they had] 'charges' against the plain-
tiff, presumably sufficient to justify his removal from office as 
Superintendant". After speaking to the plaintiff, defendants re-
peated to numerous people that they had twenty-seven charges against 
the plaintiff, and invited them to the next Board meeting (three 
days later) to hear what they were. An obvious inference that many 
persons in the community believed and that defendants intended them 
to believe was that the school board had twenty-seven criminal 
charges against the plaintiff. But the defendants have consistently 
refused to speci.fv an~' charges. On several occasions they have said n: 
in school board meetings they did not have twenty-seven charges 
against the plaintiff; at other times they have said they did. 
(Defendant Cook has specifically denied the existence of any charges 
in a deposition given in another case relating to the same nucleus 
of facts from which this case arose). Defendants at no time had 
grounds to remove the Superintendent from his position for cause, 
nor did they have any charges which if publicly proven would have 
induced him to resign his office. Thus the statement that twenty-
seven charges existed is both false on its face and false in what 
must necessarily be inferred from it. The plaintiff respectfully 
contends that the question of whether defendants' words, as they 
-6-
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reasonably understood under the circumstances, were defamatory, 
is one of fact, and that a jury should be allowed to decide it. 
Because of the great public interest in education, statements 
imputing inefficiency or lack of qualification to a school teacher 
or school official tend to injure the teacher in his occupation or 
profession. For this reason such statements are actionable. An ALR 
annotation entitled Libel and Slander: Actionability of Statements 
Imputing Inefficiency or Lack of Qualification. 40 A~R 3d490 
(The annotation included cases involving Principals and Superinten-
dants as part of Public School Teachers) is in point on this ques-
tion and gives examples of statements about school personnel that 
have been held to be actionable slander per se. An examination of 
them shows that specific allegations of wrongdoing are not necessary 
and that statements weaker than those involved here have been held 
to be actionable per se. 
a. "incompetent" (p.493) 
b. "weak spot in system" (p.493) 
c. "insufficient and inadequate with students" (p.493) 
d. "Principal paid little attention to school and 
less to teachers" (p.493) 
e. "not competent and had little control over school" 
(p.494) 
The defendants by their conduct intentionally and deliberately 
created in the minds of many the false impression that the plaintiff 
in the conduct of his office had been, at best, greatly deficient, 
and at worst, criminal. Having maliciously caused the kind of harm 
-7-
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to a professional reputation that slander laws are designed to 
protect against, the defendants should not be allowed to escape 
liability because they refused to specify any wrongdoing. In 
reality, defendants would have causedthe plaintiff less harm 
if they had specified the charges, because he would have been 
able to respond to them and clear his name. It strongly appears 
that they did not specify charges because they had none. 
The alleged slanders are per se, rather than per quod, because 
they pertain directly to plaintiff's fitness for his office and 
profession. The two definitions (suggested by defendants in their 
Memoranda in lower court) of slander that is actionable per se 
are as follows: 
"(3) conduct, characteristics, or a condition 
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful 
business, trade, profession or office," 59 Am.Jur. 
2d 524, §10 of "Libel & Slander". 
"One who publishes a slander that ascribes to 
anothersconduct, charactertistics or a condi-
tion that would adversely affect his fitness 
for the proper conduct of his lawful business, 
trade or profession, or of his public or pri-
vate office ... is subject to liability without 
proof of special harm," Restatement of Facts §573. 
The notes to §573 make it clear that the slander must relate 
to the plaintiff's professional reputation and not merely to his 
character as an individual. The defendant school board members, 
in implying that plaintiff Superintendant would not be able to 
remain in office if he did not comply with their demands, obviously 
intended to slander his fitness for the proper conduct of his office 
Plaintiff contends that his Complaint states a claim for 
-8-
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damages per se, but does not concede that he has not made a 
claim for damages per quod. 
ARGUMENT 
II 
DEFENDANTS WERE NEITHER IMMUNE NOR WERE THEIR STATEMENTS 
PRIVILEGED, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ACTING IN THE COURSE OF THEIR 
OFFICIAL DUTIES, THEY WERE NOT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH, AND THEY 
WERE NOT WITHOUT MALICE. 
Defendants claim separate defenses of statutory immunity 
under the Governmental Immunity Act (UCA 63-39-10), which 
excepts from waiver of immunity actions for libel and slander. 
Both defenses are founded upon the need to permit public offi-
cials to freely exercise the lawful functions of their office 
without fear of liability from an honest error in judgment, or 
from an act that their duties required. Plaintiff concedes that if 
the Board members were carrying out official duties at the time 
of the alleged slanders, in good faith and without malice, they 
are immune from plaintiff's action. 
But the privilege or immunity extends only to the exercise of 
official functions of their office. If they were not carrying out 
their functions, or if they were, but were not doing so in good 
faith, without malice, then no law or public policy protects 
them. Their acts become those of individuals and not of the state. 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The public interest is then best served by holding them liable 
for their actions. 
The lawful powers and duties of the school board regarding 
termination and hiring of school superintendants are defined in 
the Orderly School Termination Procedures Act (UCA 53, Chapter 51). 
An examination of them reveals that defendant school board members 
were not acting within the statutory requirements. 
"(1) This act shall be known as the "Utah Orderly School 
Termination Procedures Act." 
(2) The purpose of this act is to require school districts 
to adopt orderly termination procedures and to specify 
standards of due process and causes for termination. 
(3) (1) "Contract term" or"term of employment" means the 
period of time an educator is engaged by the school dis-
trict pursuant to a contract of employment whether oral 
or written. 
(3) (2) "Dismissal" or "termination" means: 
(a) Any termination of the status of employment of 
an educator. 
(b) Failure to rene>i the employment contract of an 
educator who pursuant to the employment practices of 
the school district has a reasonable expectation of 
continued employment in successive years. 
(c) Reduction in salary of an educator not generally 
applied to all educators of the same category in the 
employ of the school district during such educator's 
contract term. 
(d) Change of assignment of an educator with an ac-
companying reduction in pay, unless such assignment 
change and salary reduction is agreed to in writing. 
(3) "Educator" or "teacher" means all teaching and 
professional personnel of a school district who hold 
a regular contract for positions requiring certifica-
tion and valid certificates issued to them by the 
state board of education. 
(4) "C<;mtract classified school employees" mean all 
educat~onal supportive employees, working under contract 
w~th a school district. 
(4) The board of education of each school district bv con-
tract with its educators or their associations or bv 
reso~uti?n of the board shall establish procedures for 
term~nat~on of educators in an orderlv manner without 
discrimination. " 
-10-
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At the time of the alleged slanders, plaintiff's contract 
had less than two months to run. Defendants therefore were pre-
cluded from giving the required two monthsnotice, and also could 
not give the notice required in Section 4 to be given one month 
before the two montffinotice. They could not terminate plaintiff's 
contract for cause because they did not have the two-third majori-
ty of the Board required to do so (UCA 53-6-7). Instead, they 
attempted to force the plaintiff to resign by falsely claiming 
that they had twenty-seven charges against him which they would 
reveal at a public Board meeting if he did not resign. They were 
attempting to accomplish by unfair coercion what they could not 
accomplish by motion and vote. 
Furthermore, they were entitled to deliberate only as a 
Board. They had no right, duty, or authority to execute policies 
lawfully adopted by the Board. They were even less entitled to 
execute policies unilaterally conceived by them. The Utah case of 
Roe v. Lundstrom 57 P.2d 1128, 89 Utah 720, in which the court con-
sidered the liability of individual members of the Logan City 
Commission who at their own discretion caused Logan City police 
officers to close a business claimed to be operating without a 
license, delineates the difference between lawful actions by a 
Board and unproper actions by individual board members. 
"Now let us assume that the defendant commissioners 
are charged with the duty of seeing that the ordi-
nances are faithfully executed. In the exercise of 
this power, they would necessarily have to act as a 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
board and not informally and independently as individuals. 
If we are to give effect to the provision that when power 
is conferred upon the board of commissioners to perform 
any act, they may provide by ordinance the manner and de-
tails necessary to the full exercise of such powers, then 
an informal personal interference with the operation of 
the police department or any directions to its officers 
would appear to be wholly unjustified and entirely beyond 
the powers conferred upon the board, or upon the individual 
commissioners, as such ... " 
The court concluded that the Commissioners were not immune 
from liability because they were acting outside the scope of their 
authority. In the instant case, the defendants did not merely ex-
ceed the scope of the school board's authority to terminate or 
remove the Superintendant, they deliberately attempted to subvert 
the statutory requirements of notice and due process and accomplish 
by coercion what they knew they could not get the Board to official! 
do. 
The unofficial character of the alleged activities of the de-
fendants is further attesred to by their informal and even furtive 
nature. The defendants spoke to the plaintiff in a parked car, in 
violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. They employed 
threats and malicious rumors. There was no official meeting, formal 
resolution, or other color of official action. 
The Public Employees Indemnification Act (UCA Ch. 63-48) is 
not applicable to the defendants in this action, against because 
they were not engaged in the performance of their duties. The Act 
provides for suits to be defended by the government entity, and 
for judgments to be paid by the government entity, but only where 
-12-
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the acts complained of were within the scope of employment. Con-
sequently the claim of the defendants that although this suit is 
against them as individuals, it is in substance gainst the school 
board as a government entity because the school district would 
be required to defend and indemnify the school board members has 
no validity. To remove all doubt, plaintiff waived any claim against 
the school board or district in his Complaint (R-5). 
A claim of absolute privilege, in the minority of courts that 
have recognized it, also requires that the official have been en-
gaged in the performance of his duties. In McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 
263 NE 2d 85 (Ill. 1969), the court held that it was within the 
Superintendant's official duties to make recommendations concerning 
teachers, and that any such statements were absolutely privileged. 
In Smith v. Helbraun, 251 NYS 2d 533 (NY 1964), the Board of Education 
officially passed a resolution stating that greater progress could 
be made in solving educational problems of the district under new 
leadership and that the presence of the plaintiff Superintendent of 
Schools of the District was detrimental to the best interests of the 
school district and to the education of the children. No such official 
action characterizes the defendants' conduct in the instant case. 
Most jurisdictions impose a good faith requirement on claims of 
immunity by public officials, making the privilege enjoyed by them 
conditional and not absolute. Appellant contends that Utah is among 
them. Most of the cases cited by defendants in support of their claims 
of privilege and immunity contain the good faith requirement. See 
-13-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Anderson v. Granite School District, 413 P.2d 597, 17 Utah 2d 
405 (1966), Roe v. Lundstrom, 57 E 2d 1128, 89 Utah 720, Rosendnal 
Mining and Const. Co. v. Holman, 503 P.2d 446, 28 Utah 2d 396 
(1972), and Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d 367, 21 Utah 2d 314. 
The Anderson case, which dealt with the liability of school board 
members, stated the rule as follows: 
"it is the federal policy of the law that when a public 
official ac~in good faith, believing what he does 
within the scope of his authority and in the line of his 
duty, he is not liable for damages even if he makes a 
mistake in the exercise of his judgment." 413 P. 2d at 599. 
The two cases cited by defendants which do not contain a good faith 
requirement, Anderson Investment Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 379, 503 
P.2d 144 (1972) and Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 43, 134 P 626, 
(1913) do not signify that there is no good faith requirement. The 
Anderson case cites Sheffield v. Turner, supra, which squarely 
announces a good faith qualification. The Wilkinson case is an old 
one (1913), it is prior to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and 
does not deal with the good faith problem at all. 
A recent case in a close neighboring jurisdiction that deals 
directly with the question of good faith and conditional privilege 
in a school situation is Gardner v. Hollifield, 549 P.2d 266, 97 
Idaho 607 (1976). In that case the Idaho Court reversed a summary 
judgment in favor of the school board. The claimed utterance was 
that plaintiff 
"was uncompetent as a school teacher and not doing a competent job." 
The court in finding defendants' conditional privilege lost, 
-14-
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pointed out its holding in an earlier Barton case as follows: 
"Can the motives and purposes of a school board, when 
performing an official act clearly within their powers 
under the law be put in issue in an action for damages 
under the charge of civil libel? The answer must inevi-
tably be in the negative. They have no right to employ li-
belous language in the performance of their official duties 
and cannot shield themselves behind their official character 
where they have overstepped their authority or exercised 
official powers in an unlawful manner, but so long as their 
acts are clearly within the purview of the statute and are 
such as they have an unquestioned right to perform, they 
should not be subject to an action for libel on the charge 
of conspiracy or malice in doing the act." 21 Ida. at 617-
618, 123 P. at 480 (emphasis in original omitted.) 
"In our earlier opinion in Gardner v. Hollifield supra, we 
pointed out that Barton would not allow the use of defama-
tory language violative of the conditional privilege. A 
conditional privilege may be lost when a speaker on an 
otherwise privileged occasion publishes false and defama-
tory matter concerning another which either (a) he in fact 
does not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds 
for believing it to be true. See Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 
Ida. at 612, 533 P.2d 730: Barlow v. International Harvester 
Co., 95 Ida. 881, 892, 522 P.Zd 1102, 1113 (1974); Ranous v. 
HUghes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966); Prosser, Torts 
(4th ed. 1971) Sec. ll5; Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 492 (1969); 
Annot., 40A.L.R.3d 490 (1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Sec. 600 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
The defendants would have acted in good faith only had they 
brought charges pursuant to an effort to remove plaintiff for cause, 
(which they knew they could not accomplish) and only if they had 
given him notice and allowed him a hearing in which to respond to 
them, as the statute, supra, required. Even if the statute had not 
so required, Board of Regents v. Roth, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972) 
clearly imposes notice and due process requirements wherever there 
is a possibility of a stigma that will affect future employment. 
If they were not attempting to remove the plaintiff for cause, 
they had no right to do more than request his resignation. But 
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they did more than that, they slandered plaintiff when they claimed 
to have twenty-seven charges against him that they would make public 
at an upcoming meeting if he did not immediately resign. That they 
thereafter denied they had such charges in public and said they did 
have them in private was obviously done in an attempt to inflict 
personal pain or to 1.mfairly coerce plaintiff to act contrary to his 
own will, or both. The question of good faith is usually one of fact, 
and plaintiff respectfully contends that it should not be decided 
by the court on Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure 
to State a Claim. 59 Am.Jur.§l97. 
SUMMARY 
The utterances complained of were defamatory, and since they 
were obviously intended to call into question plaintiff's fitness 
for his profession, they are actionable per se. 
Defendants cannot clai~ a conditional privilege or statutory 
imm1.mity because they were not acting within tre scope of their 
authority. If they had a privilege, they lost it by their bad faith 
and malice. 
All of the issues argued herein are at the very least questions 
of fact, and should not be summarily disposed without trial. 
Respectfully submitted 
Appellant. 
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